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ANALYSIS
Thinking Small on a National Scale: 
The Russian President’s Annual Address to the Federal Assembly on 
1st December 2016
Hans-Henning Schröder, Bremen
Abstract
On 1st December, Vladimir Putin delivered the annual presidential “state-of-the-nation” address to the Fed-
eral Assembly. His address provided an overview of developments in Russia during 2016, broken down into 
four sections—ideology and domestic politics, health and social policy, economy and science and foreign 
affairs. The address was a tour d’ horizon, which touched on all areas, while carefully omitting a range of rel-
evant problems. Politically, the speech focused solely on an appeal to national greatness and unity. In terms 
of content, there was little new. The media’s reaction reflected this: the website politcom.ru ran the head-
line “The address of the ‘small things’” and Vedomosti characterised the address as “No time for sensations”.
“Stagnating Stability”
Russia’s ruling regime is stable at the end of 2016. The 
political leadership controls the country and is widely 
accepted by the population. It successfully conducted 
nationwide elections and organized solid majorities in 
representative bodies on both the federal and regional 
level. The regional administrations collaborate closely 
with the centre, which can rely on the support of the 
most important mass media outlets.
However, there are also symptoms that point to 
underlying problems. Even though the Duma elections 
brought a clear majority for the pro-government party 
“United Russia”, voter turnout was lower than usual. In 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, only 30% of the eligible 
voters went to the ballot box, and of these 30% only 
30–40% voted for “United Russia”. That means that the 
government party was only able to mobilize 11–15% of 
the eligible voters in Russia’s main metropoles. Appar-
ently, the majority of the population in Russian cities with 
over a million inhabitants do not readily identify with the 
political party, upon which the political leadership relies.
The weakness of this political foundation could 
become problematic should criticism of the leadership 
increase, as is quite possible, in light of negative eco-
nomic growth and the decline in real incomes (see Fig-
ures 1 and 2 on p. 7). In comparison with other Euro-
pean countries, the Russian population, per capita, has 
only limited resources at their disposal—wealth per cap-
ita is higher even in China, Turkey, Latvia and Estonia. 
Furthermore, wealth in Russia is extremely unequally 
distributed (see Figures 1 and 2 on p. 8). This social con-
stellation is prone to conflict. Indeed, public perception 
considers the difference between the poor and the rich 
as a serious problem (see Figures 1 and 2 on p. 9). Yet, 
at the moment, there is little willingness to protest and 
there is no organized opposition, which could challenge 
the prevailing political regime.
The daily newspaper Vedomosti has aptly coined this 
situation—in which the economy is not progressing, and 
yet the political situation is safely controlled by the cen-
tre despite latent social tension—as “stagnating stability”.
An Overview of the Annual Presidential 
Address
As noted above, the current context for Russian politics 
is, in December 2016, a stable one, but one which has 
the prospect of upheavals that will have to be taken into 
account in forthcoming years. This is something that the 
annual address to the Federal Assembly could have focused 
upon, but the experience of previous addresses’ suggested 
that we should not expect such a critical self-appraisal of 
Russian politics. Nonetheless, the annual address serves 
to convey some idea of what the leadership of the admin-
istration and society wants to be the subject of public dis-
course—and which problems it would prefer to conceal.
This year, the annual address lasted 68 minutes, 
which is eleven minutes longer than the previous year’s. 
It was structured in four sections: the first, dealt with 
domestic political questions; the second, discussed sin-
gle issue-areas in social and societal politics; the third, 
delved into developments in the economy, business and 
science; and the fourth, addressed foreign affairs.
President Putin began with internal developments in 
Russia. The core message was one of a commitment to 
“patriotic values” and the cohesion of the people. From 
this perspective, he addressed the recent Duma elec-
tions and the role of the governmental party, followed 
by touching briefly on the topic of civil society, and then 
discussing current controversies in the cultural sphere.
The social section of the address, firstly, tackled dem-
ographic questions and the problems facing the health 
care system. Subsequently, the president went on to men-
tion education and research and the role of charitable 
Non-Governmental Organizations.
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By way of some remarks about ecology and road 
infrastructure, Putin transitioned to the economic sec-
tion of the address. He enumerated some successes, but 
also stressed his desire to solve the fundamental prob-
lems facing the national economy, by among other 
methods noting the need for structural reform of indus-
try and the encouragement of entrepreneurship. Further 
topics were the capability of the banking sector, digital-
ization and the extension of science.
The final section of the address was devoted to Rus-
sia’s international position. Putin observed the grow-
ing aggressiveness of other governments towards Russia, 
but also held out an offer for collaboration, although he 
demanded that this be based on a dialog among equals. 
He also reflected on the integration of the Eurasian 
region, Russia’s relations with China and India and cau-
tiously formulated his expectations about an improve-
ment in relations with the US, in connection with the 
victory of Trump in the US Presidential election. Rus-
sia’s military and intelligence activities abroad were given 
an honorable mention. He closed the address with a call 
for the Russian people to show self-confidence and work 
for the future.
In sum, the address was a  tour d’ horizon, which 
touched upon all areas, while omitting a  set of nag-
ging questions. It contained nothing really new. This 
was reflected in the reaction by the media: the website 
politcom.ru ran with the headline “The address of the 
‘small things’” and Vedomosti characterized the address 
as “No time for sensations”.
The Economic Situation and Action 
Program
Although it only appeared as the third of the four sec-
tions, economic policy was doubtless the main topic 
of the address. This is because the future develop-
ment of the relationship between “power” and “people” 
and between the core leadership and the population 
is dependent on overcoming the Russian economy’s 
weak growth.
The president’s statements about the economic situ-
ation were accurate, but general in nature. Putin rightly 
declared that the drop in growth since 2014 can partly 
be ascribed to external factors, but that the fundamental 
problems are essentially self-made: capital, technological 
knowhow and qualified personnel are lacking, entrepre-
neurial competition is underdeveloped and the market 
is skewed. He put a positive spin on the situation, not-
ing that the decline in economic performance is slow-
ing, the reserves of the central bank are increasing and 
inflation remains lower than in the previous year. This 
was a  rather sober judgement of strengths and weak-
nesses. Going forward, Putin announced that develop-
ment goals will be defined systematically and exactly in 
the name of solving the fundamental problems of the 
Russian economy step by step.
However, in terms of concrete policy, what the pres-
ident then offered was rather thin: He praised progress in 
the agrarian sector, but had to admit that this had been 
achieved through the partition of the Russian agrarian 
market from the EU, through protectionist action. He 
lauded the positive development of arms export sales 
and invited the arms sector to increasingly launch civil 
products—a concept that previously failed in the Soviet 
Union: it was not possible to balance the underdevelop-
ment of the manufacturing sector in this way. In addi-
tion, Putin pointed to the rapid growth of the IT sec-
tor, whose 7 billion USD export revenue is equal to only 
half that generated from arms exports. He claimed that 
manufacturing exports have also risen. He called for the 
government to work out a plan to ensure that the Rus-
sian economy 2019–2020 grows faster than the world 
economy and to “strengthen Russia’s position in the 
world economy”. How this goal was to be accomplished, 
he left open. Neither did the address develop a strate-
gic plan about how to increase production in the man-
ufacturing sector to reduce Russia’s dependence on pri-
mary commodity exports.
Equally, he had little to say about how the business 
climate can be improved. The address noted that the 
security agencies should not pressurize honest entre-
preneurs in their pursuit of tackling white-collar crime. 
With that he repeated a declaration from the previous 
year which has obviously had no effect. This time, he 
directly mentioned that fake accusations were fabricated 
to put pressure on entrepreneurs. Indeed, there have been 
a series of cases in which successful entrepreneurs were 
brought to court to face fake accusations and had their 
companies seized in a cool and calculating way. How-
ever, Putin did not announce any concrete steps to pre-
vent this happening again.
Concerning the banks’ situation, the president 
explained that the Russian banking system is, in the 
meantime, able as act as a substitute for the decrease in 
foreign credits. He lauded the cleaning of the banking 
system by the central bank and the development of the 
financial sector outside of the banking system. Indeed, 
in this context, he did not react to the fact that the vol-
ume of investments in Russia have declined since 2014 
and that the figures only suggest an upward trajectory 
from the third quarter of 2016: (see Figure 1 overleaf)
Another topic covered was that of the capacity of 
Russian industry to innovate and its adaptation to the 
new digital reality. He reported on efforts to promote 
science and referred to the National Science and Tech-
nology Development Strategy, which has now been 
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signed. As in the other passages about economic policy, 
the address remained vague and did not touch on Rus-
sia’s significant shortcomings concerning innovation. 
The European Patent Office’s statistics show that Rus-
sia lags far behind other developed industrial countries 
in terms of patent applications—seen as a good indica-
tor of the capability of an economy to innovate:
As this suggests, there exists a substantial need to reform. 
However, Putin did not offer a political concept to foster 
greater economic innovation in his address.
Overall, the president did, indeed, name some of 
the most important problems facing the Russian econ-
omy in his address. He, however, provided only abstract 
thoughts on addressing them and neglected many other 
important topics. He did not elaborate on the privatiza-
tion of state enterprises. Given the outrage about the pri-
vatization of Bashneft, throughout which the large scale 
manufacturer Yevtushenkov and Economic’s Minister 
Ulyukayev were detained by the security agencies, this 
omission is incomprehensible. Putin also had nothing 
to say about the off-shore activities of Russian corpo-
rations. In 2012 he had championed a policy of de-off-
shorization, while the panama papers, which also con-
cerned Russia, were published in spring 2016. In short, 
then, Putin chose to ignore a lot of important topics and 
did not formulate a credible strategy on how to over-
come the weak growth of the economy.
Social Policy, Education, Civil Society and 
Science
Like on economics, the presidential address only covered 
some of the most pressing social and societal questions 
in Russia. He started with demographic developments, 
noting Russia has seen an increase in its birth rate, and 
then went onto discuss problems related to health care. 
He reported on the development of a system of advanced 
training to remedy the insufficient training of some med-
ical doctors, and also on the necessity to make use of the 
possibilities for telemedicine in a huge territorial coun-
try like Russia. Putin also spoke about the regulation 
of the pharmaceutical market and the expansion of the 
ambulance aviation network. These are all important 
projects, but rather singular issues. He did not address 
healthcare policy in general.
From healthcare, Putin moved on, without pause, to 
the educational system. He announced a further expan-
sion and dissemination of initiatives to ensure schools 
produce creative and independent-thinking people and 
to encourage the development of capacities to address 
complex challenges. A clear strategy on education pol-
icy was not, however, outlined in the address.
The president spent somewhat longer discussing 
an expansion of voluntary initiatives. He devoted long 
passages to the development of civil society in the form of 
“Non-Profit Organizations” (NPO—these are actually 
NGOs—Non-Governmental Organizations) in the 
social sphere. He attributed great significance to the vol-
untary character of such social work. This corresponds 
with the trend in recent years for the state to fund non-
political NGOs, whose role is take over charitable work 
and to also support it with resources. These measures 
obviously aim to integrate civil society as long as such 
activity does not lead to criticism of the state.
The president did not offer even a sentence about the 
moratorium on pension payments, which since 2015 has 
sunk pensioners’ real income and the contributed fur-
ther to the unequal distribution of wealth.
Figure 1: Capital Investment in Russia (in % compared 
to the previous year (wrt. the corresponding 
quarter of the previous year; current prices))
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Source: Details from Rosstat <http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/
new_site/business/invest/Din-inv.xls, 11 December 2016; 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/business/invest/inv16.
xls, 11 December 2016>.
Figure 2: Patent Applications by Country, 2015
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Source: Details of the European Patent Office <http://
documents.epo.org/project s/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/
00CB374174B8B835C1257F68004AAB2D/$File/Filings_by_
country_of_origin_2006-2015_en.xlsx, 29 September 2016>.
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“…for Russia”—Nationalist Rhetoric as 
a Socio-Political Agenda
It is possible to deduce from the ideological passages, 
which opened the annual address, that the president 
is well aware of the significant problems that burden 
the everyday lives of the population. In this opening, 
Putin praised the unity of the people, its readiness to 
stand together even under difficult conditions and to 
unite around “patriotic values”. “It is this readiness to 
work for our country’s sake and this sincere and deep-
seated concern for Russia that form the foundation of 
this unity we see”. Justice, truth, trust, respect, respon-
sibility, high morale, self-fulfillment—the speechwriters 
placed all these ideologically highly-charged terms in 
two paragraphs of the speech.
It is not without irony that a president, who in the 
end is responsible for reductions in real wages and huge 
disparities in wealth, and yet simply ignores these issues 
in his speech, states that: “[the Russian] People take any 
injustice and untruth very much to heart. This is a dis-
tinguishing feature of our culture in general.”
This nationalist rhetoric, which the annual address 
heavily drew on in its first minutes, evokes a national 
feeling of unity, with the speaker implying a moral-cul-
tural superiority for his point of view and warning of 
the dangers of a “weak state”. As seen elsewhere, it was 
noted, a “weak state” enables interventions from out-
side and opens the door to foreign inspired adventurism, 
coups and anarchy. According to Putin’s address, Rus-
sia does not want that: “we are a single people, a united 
people, and we have only one Russia”.
After this appeal to national unity, Putin tackled 
some recent public controversies. Without mentioning 
any names, he criticized the aggressive attacks directed 
at intellectuals for expressing their opinions. Nobody, 
says the president, can prohibit freedom of thought and 
the right to express one’s position. One can assume that 
Putin was referring, among others, to the Raikin debate.1 
Even though he criticizes the attacks of the national-
ist right on artists like Raikin, Putin, at the same time, 
notes that public debate should essentially be all about 
prioritizing the nation and its unity. Insofar as the pres-
ident ostensibly calls for a reconciliation between “lib-
erals” and “nationals”, between critics of the status quo 
and the representatives of nationalist politics, his lead-
ership clearly supports the latter groups, by advocating 
“traditional values”, nation and family, and compliance 
with the rules of a civilized discussion.
By aligning its audience with national traditions, the 
president positions Russia in counterpoint to the values 
underlying the UN Charter (1945), the Helsinki Final 
1  See Russland-Analysen 324 (in German)
Act (1975) and the Paris Charter (1990). He constructs 
a national value consensus, which aims to immunize 
Russian society against any demands for democratiza-
tion from outside—e.g. by the OSCE or the Council of 
Europe. It is hard to interpret this call for the unity of 
the “people” and his appeal to national feelings as any-
thing other than an attempt to preemptively delegiti-
mize any protests against injustice and the deterioration 
in living conditions in forthcoming years.
However, the exaltation of unity, which the address 
also relates to the Duma elections, deliberately ignores 
the current political process in Russia. In this way, Putin 
neither commented on the low turnout for the Duma 
elections, nor the variety of replacements and resigna-
tions of politicians and high ranking officials in the last 
few months. Taking this into account, the domestic 
political section of the address was very unsatisfactory.
Foreign Policy as a Side Issue
Putin’s remarks about foreign policy were also limited. 
The war in Syria was only mentioned once, while he did 
not dwell at all on the situation in the Ukraine. The 
address did not talk of Crimea as a problem for Russian 
foreign policy. Europe and the EU were not discussed, 
even though over 40% of Russia’s external trade contin-
ues to be conducted with the EU. The OSCE and the 
future of European security were not worthy of a sen-
tence in the president’s address. He portrayed Russia as 
victim of pressure and disinformation campaigns and 
demanded a dialog of equals. The address positioned 
the deepening of relations with the countries of the Eur-
asian Economic Union and the Asian-pacific region as 
the principal directions for Russian foreign policy in 
the years to come.
With respect to the US, Putin chose his words cau-
tiously: he renounced polemics and signaled his willing-
ness to engage in an equal partnership with the Trump 
administration. A collaboration between Russia and the 
USA to solve global problems is, according to the Rus-
sian president, in the interests of the whole world. With 
these statements, the self-perception still circulating 
within many Russian politicians’ heads shines through: 
They still see themselves as “the other superpower”, who 
solves the world’s problems in cooperation with the US. 
There is no recognition that the world changed perma-
nently after 1991. That, internationally, it is now China 
along with the US that have decisive influence. That, 
economically, Russia offers the world only limited pos-
sibilities and is of lesser interest than China, the US, 
Japan and the Euro area (the Russian GDP is around 
the same level as Italy’s). The group around Putin that 
constitutes Russia’s political leadership either does not 
realize this state of affairs or believes that Russia is able 
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to compensate for this weakness through the aggressive 
deployment of military means.
Vabanque—Hoping for Trump and a Rise 
in the Oil Price
The 2016 Presidential address did not develop a cred-
ible social and economic political program for the forth-
coming years. Politically, the speech focused solely on 
an appeal to national greatness and national unity.
This is astonishing given the current situation in Rus-
sia. The third Putin administration has entered troubled 
waters. The economy, which is highly dependent on 
growth in world markets, is stagnating, while there is no 
perceptible willingness to implement structural reforms. 
The last attempt to do so was Medvedev’s reforms in 
2009, which propagated the four “I’s”—investment, 
innovation, infrastructure, institutions. These reforms, 
however, failed. The Putin administration has ignored 
the ideas of the previous government—it does not even 
name, let alone discuss, the most urgent problems: how 
to overcome the disparity between rich and poor, the 
burdensome legacy of the Yeltsin era and the transfor-
mation from a planned- to a market-economy in the 
1990s. Instead, latent social tensions in Russian society 
are covered up by nationalist rhetoric. Great risks have 
been taken in foreign policy, in order to obtain presti-
gious successes in Ukraine as well as in Syria, but which 
are having a great impact on domestic policy.
Yet, it is questionable whether the regime will be able 
to preserve the status quo either domestically or inter-
nationally in the long-term, if the prevailing structural 
conditions do not change soon. It would seem as if the 
Russian political leadership are tacitly betting on a rise 
in the global oil price and a change in American for-
eign policy under Trump.
A rise in oil prices would lead to an easing of ten-
sions around economic and social problems in Russia 
and stabilize the regime in the medium term. A political 
change in US foreign policy, granting Russia greater lee-
way in the Middle East and in Europe could under cer-
tain circumstances enable a kind of “Yalta-2” arrange-
ment to be reached, whereby the EU and the US would 
withdrawal from Russia’s “sphere of interest” and give it 
free reign in the post-Soviet space. Should both devel-
opments come to pass, this would justify the risks taken 
by Putin’s government in 2014 and 2015.
If, however, these two cases do not occur, the Putin 
administration will be confronted with huge problems 
both domestically and in its foreign policy. Judging by 
the 2016 annual address, there is currently no strategy 
as to how to deal with that scenario. Moreover, Putin’s 
leading circle is clearly being reorganized, with some key 
positions now newly staffed. There is, as yet, no visibly 
clear pattern to these changes. At present, the president 
himself seems rather unenthusiastic. This was evident in 
his annual address, which in spite of all its nationalist 
rhetoric seemed rather ‘patched together’ and avoided 
many important questions. It is unclear why the presi-
dent refrains from naming prevailing problems and from 
formulating political solutions. It may be that a change 
in power amongst the ranks of the leadership is taking 
place, which has not yet been completed, and therefore, 
this new elite cohort has not yet defined its strategy. Per-
haps, they do not want to confront society with the real 
problems for as long as the nationalistic placebo effect is 
working. And, perhaps, they will be lucky with Trump 
and the oil price—then some of Russia’s problems will 
simply sort themselves out!
Translated by Rafaela Catena
About the Author
Prof. Dr. Hans-Henning Schröder taught at the Free University Berlin. He is a member of the editorial board of the 
Russian Analytical Digest and the co-founder of its German sister publication Russland-Analysen.
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Development of Real Income in Russia
STATISTICS
Figure 1: Average Income Compared to the Minimum Living Wage*
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* 100%: official minimum living wage; source: <http://cbsd.gks.ru/#, 28 November 2016>
Figure 2: Development of Real Wages in Russia 2001–2015
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Source: <http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/trud/sr-zarplata/t5.xlsx, 20 October 2016>
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Wealth in Comparison
Figure 1: Average Wealth per Adult in Selected Countries 2014 and 2015 (USD)
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Figure 2: Distribution of Adults (%) by Wealth Range (USD) in Selected Countries
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OPINION POLL
Perception of Social Inequality in Russian Society in 2016
Figure 1: Are There Significant Differences Within Present Russian Society (May 2016) That 
Could Lead to Tensions …
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Figure 2: Are There Animosities and Enmity in Our Society Between …
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… management and rank-and-file employees?
… entrepreneurs and workers?
… [ethnic] Russians and other nationalities?
… working class and intelligentsia?
… original residents and newcomers?
… town-dwellers and villagers?
… civil servants and employees of private enterprises?
1991
2016
Source: representative opinion polls by VTsIOM, 29–30 October 2016 <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115947, 15 November 
2016>
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Reactions to Putin’s Address to the Federal Assembly
Figure 1: Did You Follow the President’s Annual Address To the Federal Assembly?
Yes, I listened attentively 
to the President's 
address
15%
I did not follow the 
address attentively, I 
learnt about the basic 
ideas of the address 
from the mass media
28%
Difficult to say
2%
No, I did not follow the 
President's address
45%
I am not interested in 
politics
10%
Source: representative opinion polls by VTsIOM, 3–4 December 2016, <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115991, 9 December 2016>
Figure 2: Generally Speaking, Were the Topics of the President’s Address Interesting or Not?
More or less interesting
86%
Difficult to say
2%On the whole not 
interesting
12%
Source: representative opinion polls by VTsIOM, 3–4 December 2016, <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115991, 9 December 2016>
Source: representative opinion polls by VTsIOM, 3–4 December 2016, <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115991, 9 December 2016>
Figure 3: Specifically Speaking: Judging by the President’s Address, Do You Think the President 
Understands the Real Situation of the Country and the Problems of People Such as 
Yourself?
The President 
understands the 
situation of the country, 
the problems of people 
such as myself
77%
The President does not 
understand the situation 
of the country, the 
problems of people 
such as myself
19%Difficult to say
4%
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Gambles That May Actually Pay Off?—Russian Foreign Policy
Aglaya Snetkov, Zurich
Abstract
2016 has definitely been a notable year for Russian foreign policy and one in which many of its gambles 
appear to have paid off. The Putin regime continued to make bold use of force, both conventional as in the 
case of Syria and Ukraine and non-conventional or non-linear measures as in the case of the cyber-attacks 
on the US. As well as making active foreign policy choices, it was also a year in which Russia seemed to 
profit from many other international trends. In particular, the apparent rise of populism in the West, sym-
bolized by Donald Trump’s election to the US presidency in November. Whilst we will have to wait until 
2017 to see how these events are translated into policy-making in practice, the Putin regime does seem to 
be ending this year on a high.
2016 was a particularly eventful year for Russian for-eign policy, in which it has once again catapulted itself 
into the role of the pre-eminent villain in international 
affairs. At the same time, some of the gambles taken by 
the Kremlin seem like they could actually have paid off 
(at least in terms of the goals set for them by the regime), 
if the apparent ‘successes’ in its push in Syria, the elec-
tion of Donald Trump in the US, and the proclaimed 
wave of populism sweeping Europe are anything to go by.
Moving from crisis to crisis across the year, the Putin 
regime continued to make bold use of force, both con-
ventional as in the case of Syria and Ukraine and non-
conventional or non-linear measures as in the case of 
the cyber-attacks on the US. In this respect, the Krem-
lin’s domestic and foreign agendas remain tightly inter-
twined, whereby the assertion of Russia’s international 
role persists as a major priority in the name of securing 
the regime at home. With this aim in mind, Russia’s 
foreign policy in 2016 solidified the impression that it 
should now be considered a power that not only talks 
tough, but also acts forcefully to defend its interest both 
in what it regards as its region and beyond.
As well as making active foreign policy choices, 2016 
was also a year in which Russia seemed to profit from 
many international trends. In particular, the apparent 
rise of populism in the West, symbolized by Donald 
Trump’s election to the US presidency in November and 
the Brexit vote in the UK in July. Whilst we will have 
to wait until 2017 to see how these events are translated 
into policy-making in practice, the Putin regime does 
seem to be ending this year on a high.
Syria: Doubling Down on Military 
Operations
In many respects, 2016 saw the continuation of trends 
already witnessed during the last few years. Notably, in 
terms of the Putin regime’s willingness to use force to 
further what it sees as its national interests. The most 
illustrative example of this has, of course, been Rus-
sia’s ongoing support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 
Syria. Indeed, Russian military operations in support 
of Assad’s regime, launched in September 2015, have 
continued apace. Against a background of sustained 
criticism from different quarters and multiple failed 
attempts at negotiating a ceasefire (most prominently, 
at the Geneva peace talks in February and US–Rus-
sian talks in September), the Russian regime, as part of 
a wider coalition with Syrian and Iranian counterparts 
(together with support from Hezbollah), have clearly 
positioned themselves as determined to continue with 
the military campaign. Across the year, a  substantial 
push has been made towards key military targets, such 
as Aleppo, Palmyra, Homs, Hama and Idlib.
Operationally, the ongoing restructuring of Rus-
sian military capabilities and increased defense expendi-
tures seem to have borne fruit in terms of military effec-
tiveness. Russian military support for the Assad regime 
does appear to have turned the war around in the Syr-
ian regime’s favor. In so doing, the Russian regime and 
military hope that they have put to rest the ghost of the 
military weaknesses exhibited during the 2008 cam-
paign in Georgia.
Critically from a domestic perspective, the Putin 
regime has proven very adept in managing domestic 
perceptions about the campaign. Through the careful 
use of official reporting and propaganda, there seems 
to have been little negative fallout from this campaign 
at home. This is in spite of a wave of international con-
demnation, accusations about the extremely high civil-
ian causalities as part of the operations (estimates run in 
the high thousands, although the exact number of cas-
ualties since the start of the Russian campaign in 2015 
vary greatly between sources) and the apparent target-
ing of key infrastructure and soft targets, such as hos-
pitals, that could amount to war crimes. Yet, as Sergei 
Davidis rightly points out, Russia saw few, if any, pro-
tests against its campaign in Syria at home. Indeed, the 
majority of the Russian population seem either happy 
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to align themselves to the official stance or are mostly 
just disinterested in a military campaign taking place 
very far away from their immediate borders.
Nonetheless, while it has taken on an active military 
role in Syria, it remains highly unlikely that Russia will 
emerge as a new security provider on the global stage, in 
the wake of the growing reluctance of Western powers 
to play this role. In other words, it remains improba-
ble that, in the years ahead, Russia’s campaign in Syria 
will come to function as a blueprint for Russian exter-
nal security policy in regions far away from its borders.
Eastern Europe: the On-Going Impasse 
in Europe’s ‘Forgotten War’ and Growing 
Tensions Beyond It
Closer to home, tensions over Ukraine continued, in 
particular concerning the ongoing fighting along the 
line of contact in Donbass. Regular flashpoints and cas-
ualties remain on-going and open-ended, with many 
analysts now characterizing it as Europe’s ‘forgotten 
war’. With the peace process stalling, entrenched diplo-
matic friction persists between Russia, Ukraine and the 
West over the lack of progress towards the fulfilment of 
one another’s obligations under the Minsk II protocols. 
Indeed, in November 2016, the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) found that Russia’s actions in Ukraine 
amounted to an ‘international armed conflict’ between 
Russia and Ukraine, rather than an internal matter. The 
year ended with the Western economic sanctions regime 
against Russia still in place, and the Kremlin, in turn, 
extending its own counter-sanction measures until 2017.
Simultaneously, concerns about Russia’s use of 
‘hybrid’ tactics in Eastern Europe have grown. Russia’s 
air force continued to carry out frequent incursions 
into the NATO airspace, the Baltic fleet and the base 
in Kaliningrad have been equipped with nuclear capa-
ble missiles and several military exercises were held in 
close proximity to NATO member states, further ratch-
etting up tensions. As announced at its summit in War-
saw in July, NATO’s has responded in kind, with plans 
to increase its support for Eastern Europe, with four new 
battalions set to be stationed in this region. In addition, 
individual member states are set to provide more active 
military support to their East European allies, with 
for example the US sending more military support to 
Poland, the UK planning to send fighter jets to Romania 
and 800 personnel to Estonia, Italy sending increased 
support to Latvia, and additional German troops to 
be deployed in Lithuania. In spite of ad hoc meetings 
between the two sides within the format of the NATO–
Russia council, the overarching dynamic remains one 
of distrust, frequent sable rattling and an ongoing mil-
itary buildup in Eastern Europe.
Russia and the Rise of Populism and the 
West: Enemies Within?
Aside from ongoing military frictions in Eastern and 
Northern Europe, major concerns have also been raised 
regarding Russia’s apparent attempts to meddle in the 
West’s wider affairs. Most notably, the Putin regime’s 
use of covert political, social and economic ties with dif-
ferent “anti-establishment” and often “far right” Euro-
pean political groups, as a means to undermine a united 
front between Western allies. Indeed, the apparent wave 
of populism sweeping across Europe, seen in the Brexit 
vote in July and the apparent rising support for pop-
ulist forces in France (National Front) and Germany 
(Alternative for Germany), would seem to be of benefit 
for Russia’s current position towards Europe. Follow-
ing on from its much discussed and controversial role in 
the US Presidential elections, concerns have been voiced 
regarding Russia’s possible influence on the upcoming 
elections in France in April and in Germany in Sep-
tember. As well as debate over the implications of a vic-
tory for the more pro-Russian presidential candidates 
in France, either Marine Le Pen or François Fillon, for 
the European stance vis-à-vis Russia.
According to many, however, the main positive out-
come of the year for Russia is the election of Donald 
Trump as US president. Given the way the US Pres-
idential election campaign played out, the specter of 
Russia is set to reverberate in the US for some time to 
come. Most significantly, in relation to the apparent 
Russian-executed cyber security hack of the Democratic 
National Committee, with the emails hacked then pub-
lished by WikiLeaks. Thomas Rid notes that this was 
in effect the use of kompromat against Hilary Clinton. 
Whilst the US intelligence community, particularly the 
CIA and FBI, continue to dispute the exact nature and 
provenance of this cyber security breach, and analysts 
continue to argue over the extent to which these hacks 
were more pro-Trump or rather anti-Clinton, the 2016 
elections have become the moment when ‘the Russian 
factor’ returned to the top of agenda in the US, even 
if this is not sustained in the years ahead. Indeed, if 
the Kremlin’s involvement in the cyber hack is proven 
beyond doubt, this action would not only signal a par-
ticularly audacious move on the part of the Putin regime, 
but will escalate fear about the Russian cyber security 
threat to foreign political institutions to a much higher 
level. The expulsion of thirty-five Russian diplomats by 
the Obama administration in December was said to be 
in retaliation against the cyber security hack allegedly 
orchestrated by Russia.
The election of Trump itself could also potentially 
signal a  shift in the US policy towards Russia, if his 
advisers or appointments are anything to go by. For 
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example, the selection of General Michael Flynn to be 
the next National Security Advisor or Rex Tillerson’s, 
the chief executive of ExxonMobil with known connec-
tions to Russia, appointment to the post of the Secre-
tary of State seem to point towards a more pro-Russia 
stance than the Obama administration. Whilst Putin 
appears to have many supporters amongst US conser-
vatives and the alt-right movement, at this stage, it is 
difficult to say whether the unexpected, but perhaps 
from the Russian-point of view rather fortuitous, elec-
tion of Trump will result in a blossoming new relation-
ship between Moscow and Washington. Withholding 
a verdict seems prudent given that previous US Pres-
idents have begun their terms by promising a reset in 
relations with Russia, only for these resets and tempo-
rary upturns in relations to crumble soon after.
The election of Trump, the Brexit vote and the rise 
of populist parties and movements across Europe has 
meant that the most prominent discussion in politi-
cal and analytical circles during 2016 has been about 
the apparent rise of populism in the West. Within this 
context, some have discussed the notion that the Putin 
regime with its focus on populist and patriotic politics 
could represent the new norm, rather than an exception, 
in global power politics. Indeed, a shadow appears to 
have been cast over the West, with concern that well-
established notions, such as globalization, liberalism and 
the current configuration of the global order, are not as 
well supported by many of their own citizens as had been 
previously thought. However, caution is needed when 
comparing populism in the West and Russia.
Firstly, whilst populism, nationalism and anti-glob-
alization fervor in the West seems to be largely a bottom-
up phenomenon that has apparently taken the establish-
ment by surprise, this dynamic is obviously not evident 
in Russia. In Russia, the pernicious mixture of patriot-
ism, revanchism and anti-Westernism is the product of 
a very top-down and regime-led process, which seems, 
in turn, to have resonated with the Russian population, 
if Putin’s high popularity ratings are anything to go by.
Secondly, within official Russian discourse, the place 
of populist anti-establishment sentiments is filled by anti-
Westernism. In spite of the prominent role of such anti-
Westernism in the Kremlin’s discourse over recent years, 
it remains quite an unstable and potentially temporary 
(at least in terms of the most extreme threads to this dis-
course) narrative, because the regime continues to sug-
gest that relations with the West could be regularized if 
and when the West starts to take Russia seriously and 
treats it as an equal once more. In this way, the anti-West-
ernism of the Putin regime does not exhibit the same 
level of negation of the ‘other’ (i.e. the establishment) as 
demonstrated by the populist movements in the West.
Thirdly, in spite of all the talk of counter-sanc-
tions, production substitution and the need to revamp 
its domestic economy, the Putin regime’s position is 
neither in essence an anti-globalization one, nor as in 
favor of economic nationalism, as some of the populist 
hardliners in Europe or the US. Hence, whilst as noted 
above, the Russian regime is obviously keen to build 
relations with populist groupings in the West, this does 
not mean that their ideologies or political programs are 
completely aligned. Indeed, for Russia, these relations 
are much more about finding cooperative partners, in 
order to undermine what they see as the anti-Russian 
establishment in the West, rather than facilitating the 
spread of a particular Russian-brand of populism.
Where similarity can be found between populism 
in the West and the Putin regime is that both are pre-
dominantly a domestic phenomenon, arisen out of local 
circumstances. Due to this trajectory, whilst similar-
ities maybe found between the two, the respective push 
and pull factors driving their domestic development are 
substantially different from one another. It is therefore 
unlikely that a single populist coalition could ever be 
formed that includes both Russia and Western popu-
list forces.
The Continued Push to the East
In counterpoint to the tension with the West, 2016 
also saw the continuation of another trend within Rus-
sian foreign policy over recent years, the attempt to 
expand its international partnerships, particularly with 
regards to the so-called push to the East. The year saw 
an ongoing strengthening and deepening of relations 
with China, despite the negative and lingering legacy of 
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and active involvement 
in Syria. For Russia, China remains a key ally, although 
the economic asymmetry between the two is becoming 
ever more prominent, with Russia increasingly a junior-
partner in a relationship that is more and more centered 
on Russia’s supply of energy to China.
Elsewhere, the twist and turns in the Russian–Turk-
ish relationship again grabbed headlines. Over the course 
of the year, the animosity between Ankara and Mos-
cow, following the shooting down of the Russian Sukhoi 
Su-24 plane by the Turkish Airforce in November 2015, 
thawed. The breakthrough in relations came following 
the anti-regime coup attempt in Turkey in July, after 
which Putin came out strongly in support of Erdogan. 
Although both sides are seemingly determined to get 
their relationship back on track, they remain sensitive 
to shocks, not only because they find themselves sup-
porting different sides in the Syria conflict, but also as 
a result of one-off events, such as the recent fatal shoot-
ing of Andrei Karlov, the Russian ambassador to Tur-
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key. And this event did not seem to derail Russia and 
Turkey brokering a ceasefire deal for Syria at the end 
of December.
The 2016 Russian Foreign Policy Concept
At the close of the year (30 November), a new Foreign 
Policy Concept was approved by President Putin. As 
others have noted, this new document does not repre-
sent a radical change from the previous 2008 or 2013 
document, with only a few themes cast differently. A key 
theme that continues to permeate the concept is the pro-
motion of Russia’s ‘position as a center of influence in 
today’s world’, with a particular emphasis on Russia’s 
historic role in the world. Rather than stressing that 
Russia is part of a wider European civilization, the new 
concept draws distinctions between Europe and Eur-
asia, with Russia now presented as an independent pole 
within the international system. In so doing, it places 
the blame for global instability squarely on western 
governments for seeking to contain others and impos-
ing their own perspectives on the international system. 
Also noteworthy is that the new concept highlights the 
role and use of force and military might in interna-
tional affairs. Whilst concerns about the ongoing global 
terrorist threat, WMDs, cyber security and informa-
tion security are reiterated. The usual emphasis is also 
placed on the role of the UN and international law, with 
apprehension expressed about the use of the principles 
of human rights and responsibility-to-protect to ‘exert 
political pressure and interfere in the internal affairs of 
states, including by destabilizing them and overthrow-
ing legitimate governments’. Indeed, according to the 
doctrine, the changing situation in the world continues 
to preoccupy Russian policy makers, with the impact of 
globalization, uneven development and disparity iden-
tified as key causes of global tensions, alongside civili-
zational struggles.
In regional affairs, relations with Belarus are allo-
cated a special place, whilst Ukraine is mentioned only 
twice. Even then, the concept talks about the ‘Ukrainian 
internal conflict’ or Russia’s interest in ‘developing polit-
ical, economic, cultural and spiritual ties with Ukraine 
in all areas based on mutual respect and commitment to 
building partnership relations with due regard for Rus-
sia’s national interests.’ More widely, the usual impor-
tance is accorded to the Eurasian Economic Union and 
Collective Security Treaty Organization, somewhat less 
so for the Commonwealth of Independent States, as the 
key institutional mechanisms of the region.
When it comes to relations with the West, the West 
is blamed for the ongoing crisis in Russian–Western 
relations, with Russia apparently averse to the creation 
of ‘dividing lines’ in Europe. Whilst little mention is 
made of sanctions, the EU continues to be described as 
an important economic and foreign policy partner for 
Russia, and a particular emphasis is given to bilateral ties 
with Germany, France, Italy and Spain. Less mention is 
made of its relations with the US, since the document 
was drafted prior to Donald Trump’s election, at a time 
when Clinton’s victory seemed most likely and therefore 
previous trends in relations were to be expected. None-
theless, it is noted that Russia ‘is interested in building 
mutually beneficial relations with the United States of 
America’, but only if it gives up ‘its restraining course’.
A lot of emphasis is also placed on Russia’s push to 
the East, both within the frameworks of the SCO, East 
Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and economic 
cooperation in Asia-Pacific, but also crucially in terms 
of its relations with China. Cooperation with China is 
noted as covering multiple issue-areas, whereby ‘Russia 
views the convergence of principled approaches adopted 
by the two countries to addressing the key issues on the 
global agenda as one of the core elements of regional and 
global stability’. Regarding Syria, the document empha-
sizes Russia’s ongoing support of the status quo, not-
ing that it ‘supports the unity, independence and terri-
torial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic as a secular, 
democratic, pluralistic state with all ethnic and relig-
ious groups living in peace and security and enjoying 
equal rights and opportunities.’
All in all, the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept does not 
represent a radical change in course for the Russian for-
eign policy. Furthermore, considering the increased reg-
ularity with which new concepts have been produced 
in recent years, and the potential for changes in Rus-
sian relations with the US and its European partners in 
the near future, the 2016 concept may quickly become 
obsolete.
Looking Ahead
In sum, 2016 has definitely been a notable one for Rus-
sian foreign policy. Some of the gambles taken look like 
they could potentially pay off. However, only time will 
tell whether if this is indeed the case. At this point, it 
remains unknown whether the election of Trump to 
the US presidency will result in a real thaw in relations. 
It is also too early to discern whether a political re-
configuration in Europe will, one, further develop and, 
two, push Europe in a more pro-Russian direction, or 
at least mean an end or loosening of the ongoing sanc-
tions regime. In other words, it still remains to be seen 
whether, in the near term, Russia will once again be 
brought in from the cold.
However, it does seem that the Putin regime’s pop-
ulist and patriotic rhetoric no longer looks quite as at 
odds with wider trends in the West. Crucially, 2016 
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has also become a year in which the West’s attention 
has increasingly turned inward, with the EU’s ongoing 
attempts to manage the fallout from Brexit, the rise of 
populism and the potential, though unlikely, derailing 
of the European project, and the US establishment’s 
attempts to make sense of the election of Donald Trump 
as president. And, in these circumstances, a key ques-
tion is whether the West has the time, energy or space 
to adequately deal with or manage the Russian question, 
amidst this wider reconfiguration of political forces and 
domestic constellations. Equally, the key concerns for 
Russia are also domestic—the faltering economy, the 
looming presidential elections in 2018 and the ongoing 
security and survival of the Putin regime.
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Figure 1: In Your Opinion, Should Russia Continue the Intervention in Syria?
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Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 21–24 October 2016 <http://www.levada.ru/2016/10/31/sirijskij-konflikt/
print/, 31 October 2016>
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Russian Attitudes Towards the Syrian Conflict
Figure 2: How Have the Russian Air Attacks in Syria Influenced Attitudes Towards Russia in 
the International Arena? Attitudes Towards Russia Have …
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 21–24 October 2016 <http://www.levada.ru/2016/10/31/sirijskij-konflikt/
print/, 31 October 2016>
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ANALYSIS
2016 in Review: Russian Domestic Politics
Vladimir Gel’man, St. Petersburg/Helsinki
Abstract
2016 was a routine year of further consolidation of Russia’s authoritarian regime. Using a strategy of three 
“Ds”—disengagement, destruction, and disinformation—almost all domestic challenges to the Kremlin’s 
dominance were eliminated, the popular legitimacy of the political order has been restored to a certain 
degree, and even the stiff competition between interest groups for access to rents has not really challenged 
the political status quo.
Unlike previous even years, such as 2012 or 2014, 2016 has not brought major changes in Russian 
domestic politics, comparable with Putin’s return to the 
presidency or rally around the flag after Russia’s annex-
ation of Crimea. Rather, it was a  routine year of fur-
ther consolidation of Russia’s authoritarian regime, and 
the Kremlin successfully realized its goals. Almost all 
real and potential domestic challenges to the Kremlin’s 
dominance were eliminated (at least, in the short term), 
the popular legitimacy of the political order (seriously 
shaken during the wave of mass protests in 2011–2012) 
has been restored to a certain degree, and even the stiff 
competition between interest groups for access to rents 
has not really challenged the political status quo.
In essence, the recipe for the Kremlin’s success in 
2016 can be considered through a 3D prism—these 
three “Ds” being disengagement, destruction, and dis-
information. The trend towards the building of an effi-
cient propaganda machine, together with the extensive 
use of coercive threats against the regime’s rivals along-
side the previously visible political demobilization, saw 
2016 become a logical extension of what the Kremlin 
has achieved so far.
Elections without Choice?
Elections to the State Duma, held on 18 September 2016, 
fully restored the pre-2011 equilibrium of unilateral 
dominance by United Russia (UR) in the lower house 
of the Russian parliament. The Kremlin has learned sev-
eral lessons from its failure at previous parliamentary 
elections and effectively employed political and institu-
tional tools to secure full-fledged control over the elec-
toral process. First and foremost, the parliamentary elec-
toral system has changed once again. While the 2007 
and 2011 State Duma elections were held under propor-
tional representation (PR) with a 7% threshold, in 2016 
a mixed electoral system with a 5% threshold (similar 
to those used in 1993–2003) was restored: 225 seats are 
designated to single-member districts (SMD), and 225 
seats are distributed proportionally according to party-
list voting. Previously, the use of a mixed electoral system 
in Russia had resulted in significant influence for local 
notables in SMD races, against the background of the 
Kremlin’s weak political control over the regions. How-
ever, the installation of PR offered limited benefits for 
regional chief executives: they had little chance to place 
their nominees in parliamentary seats nationwide, but 
were responsible for the delivery of votes to the Krem-
lin’s party in their respective regions. The restoration of 
a mixed electoral system provided them with a balanced 
combination of both positive and negative incentives 
in terms of conducting their campaigns in the regions, 
because of their primary role in SMD races. Unsur-
prisingly, the geography of SMDs in many regions led 
to gerrymandering in favor of rural areas, where local 
political machines could operate in full swing without 
serious resistance. In fact, given the strength of regional 
political machines, UR won in almost all SMD races 
except those, where it refused to nominate its candi-
dates in favor of other parties, who are also loyal to the 
Kremlin. While in PR races, UR performed just a little 
bit better than in 2011, SMDs delivered unchallenged 
dominance to “the party of power” in the State Duma 
(see Tables 1 and 2).
Yet another factor of the campaign was change to 
the electoral schedule. All previous State Duma elections 
had been conducted in December, but in 2016 polls 
were held in September. This move aimed to decrease 
public interest in the elections, because of the summer 
vacation season and thus lower voter turnout (and leave 
ample opportunities for manipulations during the poll-
ing day) and diminish the possible effects of negative 
campaigning (which had been visible during the 2011 
elections). At the same time, the Kremlin intended to 
avoid major scandals and accusations concerning elec-
toral unfairness. The list of parties that were allowed 
to run was extended to 14 entities (vis-à-vis 7 parties 
in 2011 elections), including “non-systemic” entities, 
such as PARNAS (which received less than 1% of the 
vote). Although these measures largely served as cam-
ouflage, the Kremlin’s maneuver bore major fruits. The 
officially reported turnout decreased to less than 48%, 
and in big cities, just about one third of voters cast their 
ballots. According to some estimates, the scope of elec-
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toral fraud in various forms was somewhat comparable 
with those in 2011. However, no major protests were 
observed after the polls. In 2016, Russia’s voters, who 
were actively engaged in politics during the previous par-
liamentary elections and its aftermath, turned to disen-
gagement, if not apathy: many of them abstained from 
voting, as well as from other forms of political partic-
ipation. Why?
Fear and Loathing in Russia
The repressive turn of the Kremlin, launched after the 
2011–2012 protests, aimed to avoid the risks of anti-
regime mobilization in the wake of the coming elec-
tion cycle and beyond. This turn was also driven by eco-
nomic constrains—the economic recession against the 
background of the declining global oil prices and inter-
national sanctions (as well as Russia’s counter-sanctions) 
left no room for further buying of loyalty from fellow 
citizens: quite the opposite, real wages and pensions in 
Russia were decreased just before the elections and will 
decline further in coming years. The Kremlin effectively 
used a repertoire of repressive policies, which included: 
(1) harassment and intimidation of the regime’s rivals, 
both individuals and organizations (first and foremost, 
NGOs, which were considered as nodes of networks of 
anti-regime activism); (2) increasing the regime’s control 
over the spread of information, ranging from the replace-
ment of leaderships in media outlets to the extension of 
anti-extremist laws; and, (3)  regime-induced hysteria 
around “culture wars”, which was effectively employed 
as a tool for the consolidation of public opinion around 
the regime and to publically discredit its opponents.
The combination of new harsh regulations and their 
selective enforcement became the essence of this system-
atic and consistent “politics of fear” in Russia, which had 
reached its goals by 2016. Despite the rise in the number 
of economic protests (such as those of truck drivers, who 
united against the introduction of toll road payments), 
these were largely localized and contained by regional 
governments. At the same time, the number of partic-
ipants in anti-regime protests decreased, hundreds of 
activists and regime opponents fled the country, fear-
ing criminal prosecution and/or further “tightening of 
the screws”, and many independent organizations were 
either closed down, or diminished their voice, imposing 
self-censorship, and often, being stigmatized as “national 
traitors”, were locked into their narrow niches and faced 
numerous troubles. In 2016, rbc.ru, the media holding, 
owned by Mikhail Prokhorov, was forced to replace its 
leadership and moderate its contents; a number of other 
media resources, including Novaya Gazeta and Vedo-
mosti (let alone a number of local sites), were pressured 
under libel cases, and sometimes reduced their critical 
tone towards the Kremlin. During 2016, the official list 
of “foreign agents”, compiled by the Ministry of Justice, 
extended to 148 entities, including the largest Russian 
network of human rights activists, Memorial, as well as 
the most reputable polling agency, the Levada Center. 
The number of political prisoners in Russia, according 
to Memorial, increased to 52 by October 2016 (while in 
October 2015 this number was 40). Still, it remains rel-
atively low in comparison to many authoritarian regimes 
across the globe.
In addition, the threats of violence against the 
regime’s opponents have been expanded, and pro-regime 
activists (such as National Liberation Movement, NOD) 
and other militant groups (such as “Orthodox activists”, 
etc.) operated under informal protection from the Krem-
lin. Previously, practices of non-state political violence 
were typical only in the North Caucasus, but in 2016 
they began to spread across the country. Although no 
acts of violence comparable with the 2015 murder of 
Boris Nemtsov have been observed as of yet, the atmos-
phere of loathing affected some fields beyond politics: 
the number of scandals over forced closures of art exhi-
bitions and other cultural events, because of pressure 
from pro-regime actors, greatly increased in Russia, thus 
sending visible signals to everyone.
Predictably, the repressive turn had a major devas-
tating impact on opposition parties and their supporters 
before the 2016 State Duma elections. Yet, systemic 
opposition parties, such as the Communist Party of Rus-
sian Federation or Just Russia aligned with Kremlin and 
only criticized some of its policies: they preferred pres-
ervation of the status-quo to regime changes. Non-sys-
temic opposition parties were severely pressured by the 
Kremlin, and their mobilization capacity remains very 
low. PARNAS, which claimed to provide an umbrella 
for the campaigns of various anti-regime activists, expe-
rienced major schisms, and failed to cooperate with 
Yabloko for the same limited pool of voters. The most vis-
ible opposition leader, Alexey Navalny had been legally 
disqualified from balloting and some of his allies boy-
cotted elections without making any effect on disen-
gaged voters. The 2016 State Duma elections represent 
a striking contrast with those of 2011, when Navalny 
and other opposition figures effectively organized a neg-
ative anti-Kremlin campaign, under the slogan “vote 
for anyone but United Russia!” Instead of the enthu-
siasm and hope of 2011–2012’s “winter of discontent”, 
doom and gloom dominated Russia’s political land-
scape in 2016.
Television, the Fridge, and Rents
Against the background of the post-2014 economic 
decline, many analysts and pundits predicted the rise 
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of anti-regime sentiments among Russians, despite 
the comprehensive propagandist efforts of the Krem-
lin. These expectations are often discussed in terms of 
a battle between the TV and the fridge, as the two 
major information sources for ordinary citizens (i.e., 
propaganda vs. consumption). In 2016, despite some 
decline of popular trust in the media, the power of TV 
remains unshakable: a number of surveys demonstrated 
high and genuine public support for Putin and for Rus-
sia’s regime (in November 2016, 56% of Levada Center 
survey respondents stated that the country is going in 
the right direction, 86% approved of Putin’s rule, and 
two thirds supported the continuity of his presidency 
beyond 2018). One should admit, however, that the 
decline in real incomes among the Russian population 
has been sensitive only vis-à-vis their previous peak of 
2013–2014 (over 10% by various estimates). While the 
well-being of most Russians, in 2016, returned back to 
the level of 2011–2012, it does not even slightly resem-
ble those of the 1990s. In fact, the fridge remains full 
enough, even though its contents are a little less plen-
tiful due to a gradual decrease in the consumption of 
goods, clothes, and food. This is why political immo-
bility for the sake of the preservation of the status quo 
seems to be a reasonable preference for a large part of 
Russians. In this respect, the effect of aggressive and 
comprehensive state-led propaganda has not been related 
to an endorsement of the Kremlin as such, but rather to 
persuade the public about the lack of viable alternatives 
to it. At least in 2016, the disengaged Russians tend to 
buy this argument, and given this perception, they have 
not demanded major political changes.
While mass politics in Russia remained calm in 2016, 
elite politics witnessed several major reshuffles. While 
Putin fired his long-term ally, Sergei Ivanov, from the job 
of the head of presidential administration and appointed 
Anton Vaino as his replacement, the Kremlin’s chief 
political strategist, Vyacheslav Volodin, became the chair 
of the State Duma after the elections, being replaced by 
the former prime minister and head of Rosatom, Sergei 
Kirienko. With respect to the coercive apparatus, a new 
player, the National Guard, led by Putin’s former body-
guard, Viktor Zolotov, was established in 2016, absorb-
ing some of the powers and apparatus of the Ministry of 
Interior and other federal services. According to some 
assessments, the ongoing hidden, but stiff competition 
between various agencies (Office of the Prosecutor Gen-
eral vs. Investigative Committee, etc.) increased in 2016, 
because of the shrinking pool of rents available to Putin’s 
cronies. Several high profile criminal cases, launched in 
2016, involved not only the arrest of a regional governor 
(Nikita Belykh in Kirov oblast, joining the list of pre-
vious suspects in Komi and Sakhalin oblast), but also 
accusations against the heads of some federal agencies 
(chief of the custom service Andrey Belyaninov). In 
November 2016, Alexey Ulyukaev, the minister of eco-
nomic development and the long-standing “systemic 
liberal” in the government, was accused of bribery and 
lost his job in the wake of a hostile takeover of oil com-
pany Bashneft, by the top management of state-led oil 
giant Rosneft, led by another of Putin’s long-term ally, 
Igor Sechin (Ulyukaev and his ministry opposed this 
deal). The struggle for rents dominated the preparation 
of the state budget for 2017–2019, approved by UR’s 
super-majority in the new State Duma: while military 
and security spending projections increased, many wel-
fare costs (including those for public health) were either 
decreased or transferred to regional budgets (which lack 
funds anyway).
To summarize, in 2016, the Kremlin succeeded in 
entrenching Russia’s politico-economic order and in 
avoiding major challenges to its dominance, despite 
the economic slowdown and poor prospects for further 
growth and development. The other side of this coin 
is that not only did the Kremlin’s 3Ds approach meet 
little resistance, but also almost nobody in Russia per-
ceives of realistic positive scenarios for the country. As 
a title for the year look no further than the new book, 
published in October 2016, by St. Petersburg scholar 
and analyst Dmitry Travin, “Will Putin’s System Sur-
vive until 2042?” Yet, major challenges for Russia may 
arise much earlier than this date.
About the Author
Vladimir Gel’man is a Professor in the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology, the European University at St. Peter-
sburg and Finland Distinguished Professor at the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki.
RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 195, 22 December 2016 19
Table 1: State Duma Elections, 2007–2016, Party List Voting
Party/year 
(% party-list votes)
2007 2011 2016
United Russia 64.3 49.3 54.3
Communist Party 11.6 19.2 13.5
LDPR 8.1 11.7 13.2
Just Russia 7.7 13.2 6.2
Others (total) 7.1 3.5 11.0
Table 2: Distribution of Seats in the State Duma, 2007–2016
Party/year 2007 2011 2016
total (party-list + SMD seats)
United Russia 315 238 343 (140+203)
Communist Party 57 92 42 (35+7)
LDPR 40 56 39 (34+5)
Just Russia 38 64 23 (16+7)
Others (total) 0 0 3  (0+3)
OPINION POLL
Should Putin Continue as President after 2018?
Figure 1: Would You Like to See Putin Con-
tinuing as President after the Ex-
piration of His Present Term as 
President in 2018?
Yes
63%
Difficult to 
say
19%
No
19%
Figure 2: Is It Possible That a Leader Will 
Appear in Russia Before 2018 Who 
Is Capable of Replacing Vladimir 
Putin as President after the End of 
Putin’s Present Term as President?
Yes
26%
Difficult to 
say
26%
No
49%
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, 21–24 October 2016, <http://www.levada.ru/2016/11/16/alternativa-vladimiru-
putinu-2/, 17 November 2016>
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ANALYSIS
The Russian Economy in 2016
Philip Hanson, London
Abstract
Russian output was declining year on year during 2016, with the prospect of a sluggish recovery at best dur-
ing 2017. This state of affairs is put in perspective by comparison with the West. The main features of the 
economy in 2016 are reviewed. Prospects for 2017 are assessed.
In 2016 Russia was in worse shape economically than the developed West. That was no mean achievement. 
The global economic crisis and its aftermath have dam-
aged both Russia and the West, but not in equal meas-
ure or in closely similar ways. What is distinctive about 
the current Russian economic difficulties? Why is there 
so much concern about ‘stagnation’? How has Russian 
economic policy responded to the crisis? What are the 
prospects for the near future?
An East–West Perspective
From mid-2014 Russia demonstrated once again its eco-
nomic sensitivity to a fall in the oil price. Western sanc-
tions added to the country’s difficulties. In 2015 and 
2016 Russian economic activity declined. In the G-7 
countries, in contrast, output was sluggish but contin-
ued to edge upwards.
In 2016 Russian GDP was expected to decline by 
at least half a percentage point year on year. This was 
an improvement: the figure for 2015 was -3.7%. Growth 
had been slowing after 2012, while the oil price was still 
high. The contrast with the rapid growth of 1999–2008 
was stark. Then Russian economic growth had easily 
outpaced that of the West. Figure 1 illustrates.
Hence the talk, not so much of recession but of stagna-
tion (stagnatsiya): Russia’s policy-makers note that their 
nation’s share of global output has been edging down-
wards since 2012, and the economy is no longer catch-
ing up the developed West, even at a  time when the 
Western economic system is in difficulties. And there 
is still a lot of catching up to do, as Figure 2 illustrates.
Russia should, as a medium-developed country, be 
able to grow faster in the medium term than the devel-
oped economies. It has a technological backlog to catch 
up, and good educational levels. The working-age pop-
ulation is declining, it is true, but total employment is 
not, and in any case, investment in research and devel-
opment and in physical and human capital could offset 
a lack of growth in labour inputs. Such investment how-
ever is not happening, for reasons to be considered later.
It is the failure in recent years to narrow the gap 
behind the developed West, and the lack of any obvious 
prospect of doing so, that lies behind the concern with 
‘stagnation’. Russia may well return to growth, but if it is 
slow growth that does not at least maintain the nation’s 
share of global output, it is treated in Russian political 
discourse as stagnatsiya.
Developments in 2016
This year, as noted above, the level of economic activity 
will be down by significantly less than it was last year. 
Figure 1: Russia and the G-7: Real GDP Growth, 
2000–2016 Expected (Annual % Change)
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2016
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Consumer-price inflation will be lower: an end-year fig-
ure of about 5.8% will represent a substantial improve-
ment on last December’s 12.9%.
During 2016 members of the government 
repeatedly spoke of signs that the recession was com-
ing to an end. So far the decline has slowed but not 
ended.
As inflation has come down, real wages have edged 
up again, but households have gone into economising 
mode. They are saving rather than borrowing. Retail 
sales remain depressed. The overall decline in economic 
activity in 2015–16, at somewhat more than 4%, is shal-
lower than that of 2009 (7.8%), but already more pro-
longed and with a more severe effect on household con-
sumption. Good weather has helped to create a record 
grain harvest in 2016, but that is a rare piece of good 
news.
What are the immediate causes of this disarray? 
Some of them are external. The oil price, though no 
longer falling like a stone, remains at levels well below 
those of recent history. The rouble remains at levels 
well below those of 2013 or early 2014 though its vol-
atility has declined along with that of the oil price. The 
close linkage between the oil price and the rouble-dol-
lar exchange rate is shown in Figure 3 (The simple cor-
relation between the two series shown in that Figure 
is 0.953.)
Sanctions continue to limit Russian state and busi-
ness access to external finance, perhaps taking about 
0.5%.off annual GDP growth. The average growth 
rate of the countries with which Russia trades (an 
average weighted by their shares in Russian exports) 
is about 2%. The outside world is not about to come 
to the rescue.
Domestic demand is weak, and likely to strengthen only 
slowly. Fixed investment, never high by the standards 
of ‘catching-up’ countries, stagnated in 2013 and has 
fallen since. Consumer demand has been hit by a period 
of falling real personal incomes—the fall being due pri-
marily to the surge in inflation triggered by rising import 
prices as the rouble fell. Government current spending 
is subject to an austerity drive, now planned to extend 
even to military spending. See Figure 4.
Underlying Domestic Problems
Evidently, Russia has encountered a perfect storm: fall-
ing oil prices above all. But the problems with GDP 
growth and investment pre-date the annexation of Cri-
mea and the fall in oil prices. Growth in 2010–11 did not 
Table 1: Russia: Economic Indicators in the First Ten 
Months of 2016 (Year-on-Year % Change 
Unless Otherwise Specified)
GDP -0.8
Industrial output  0.3
Construction -5.0
Real wages  0.5
Retail sales -5.3
Grain harvest 15
Unemployment (% rate end of period)  5.2
Balance of payments current account 
($bn)
16.0
Balance of payments: net private capital 
flow ($bn)
-10.4
Sources: Alfa Bank; Central Bank of Russia
Figure 3: The Brent Oil Price and the Rouble–Dollar 
exchange rate, 1 January 2014 to 1 October, 
2016 (Monthly, Indexes 1 January 2014 = 
100, Exchange Rate in Cents per Rouble)
Sources: Central Bank of Russia and euroinvestor,com
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return to the rates of 1999–2008. Thereafter it slowed. 
What had changed?
The oil price, though historically high, was no longer 
rising strongly. Employment growth was stuttering. The 
role of the state in the economy was tending to rise and 
net private capital outflows, though below the panic 
level of 2014 ($152 billion), were substantial. In these cir-
cumstances systemic weaknesses that had been present 
all along, may have become more apparent as binding 
constraints on growth.
The weak rule of law may be crucial. Every prescrip-
tion for strengthening Russian economic performance 
includes a reference to improving the business climate. 
It seems that there is a problem about the business envi-
ronment whose existence is universally acknowledged. 
Exactly what it is, tends to be left unspecified. There is 
talk of more state support for small business, tax breaks 
and a reduction in red tape. Sometimes reforms to the 
judiciary and law-enforcement agencies are mentioned, 
but usually without elaboration. The elephant in the 
room is asset-grabbing. In the words of Yulia Tseplaeva 
of Sberbank, ‘What sort of [tax] exemptions and stimuli 
can we talk about if at any moment an official can take 
away your business.’ (Vedomosti, 9 May 2016)
The problem is that business rivals with good politi-
cal connections to corrupt law-enforcement agents and 
courts can get the main owner of a company put in pre-
ventive detention on trumped-up charges, usually of 
‘economic crimes’, and secure control of all or part of the 
victim’s business in return for their freedom.
The number of cases of economic crimes ‘detected’ is 
often taken as an approximate indicator of the amount of 
asset-grabbing going on. That number has been increas-
ing as economic conditions have worsened. The number 
detected by the FSB has risen from 1586 in 2012 to 2926 
in 2015 and 1988 in the first half of 2016 (Nikolai Pet-
rov and Kirill Rogov in New Times, 14 November 2016).
This ingredient in Russia’s business environment 
deters people from opening and growing businesses 
and thus helps to keep investment comparatively low. 
If the phenomenon has been getting worse, this effect 
will have become more damaging.
Policy in a crisis
Whatever the institutional weaknesses in the economy, 
macroeconomic policy has, for better or worse, been 
orthodox in a Western, liberal sense. The Central Bank 
of Russia (CBR) let the rouble float in November 2014 
and switched its policy focus from the exchange rate to 
inflation targeting. It is true that the rouble promptly 
sank and inflation surged, but the foreign exchange 
reserves stopped melting away and in time consumer-
price inflation has come down towards the CBR’s end-
2017 target of 4%. The bank has kept interest rates well 
above inflation (the CBR’s key rate in late 2016 was 10% 
while consumer inflation was about 6% and falling). 
This is unpopular with business, but so far Putin has 
given CBR chair Elvira Nabiullina his backing.
Fiscal policy has also been orthodox. On 28 October 
the government submitted to the Russian parliament 
a draft federal budget for 2017 and budget plans for 2018 
and 2019 that entailed real-terms cuts in expenditure. 
Spending in 2016 had already been cut earlier in the 
year. The present budget plans are based on an assump-
tion, insisted upon by the Ministry of Finance (MinFin), 
that the Urals oil price will average $40/barrel through 
2018. The oil price is crucial for federal budget revenue, 
as Figure 5 indicates.
The budget plans, however, may be less secure than the 
CBR’s monetary programme. Indeed Nabiullina lists 
budgetary policy as one of the uncertainties with which 
the CBR has to contend. The cuts have been conten-
tious, reportedly provoking angry exchanges within the 
government. Presidential elections loom in 2018, and 
Prime Minister Medvedev has already said that if the oil 
price goes higher than the $40/barrel budget assump-
tion, spending limits can be reconsidered.
In short, the fiscal policy stance is one of austerity 
but, as in other countries pursuing so-called ‘fiscal con-
solidation’, it is a policy under siege.
Prospects
In 2017 a new economic strategy is to be unveiled and 
discussed. It is unlikely to be coherent. If it is, and if is 
Figure 5: Russian Federal Budget: Total Revenue 
and Expenditure and Oil and Gas Reve-
nue, 2006–16 (Billions of Roubles, Current 
Prices)
Source: MinFin. Note: the first-half figures for 2016 have been 
crudely annualised by doubling them.
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significantly different from the present operating princi-
ples, it is unlikely to be adopted. Two teams—a ‘liberal’ 
group led by former finance minister Aleksei Kudrin 
and a group with statist inclinations led by Boris Titov 
and Sergei Glazyev—are working on their programmes 
which are then to be synthesised into a single strategy 
aimed at raising the growth rate of the Russian economy 
to about 4% a year. The Kudrin group espouse austerity, 
the Titov-Glazyev group advocate stimulus. It is hard 
to see how a joint plan of substance can emerge. Both 
say they want to improve the business environment, but 
moving towards a rule of law without profound politi-
cal change may be difficult.
A gradual recovery of household consumption, 
together with a continued positive trade balance (even 
without a sustained rise in the oil price), is likely. The 
financial reserves can, on present fiscal plans, just about 
last out while the federal budget deficit is reduced from 
its 2016 level of about 4% of GDP. The Reserve Fund 
will be almost entirely drawn down during 2017, but 
that leaves the National Welfare Fund, with a further 
reserve of about 4% of GDP available. The curious ‘pri-
vatisation’ of Bashneft by the state-owned Rosneft and 
the further privatisation of 19.5% of Rosneft, by sale 
to a Qatari wealth fund plus Glencore, will help out, 
however murkily. So the public finances can probably 
muddle through.
A slow recovery of output, with GDP increasing 
by about 1%, is widely expected, Nobody can predict 
the oil price, but it may well do better than is assumed 
in the budget plans. That would solve the most acute 
problems—leaving the longer-term problem of sluggish 
growth still to be faced.
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